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Abstract
The issue of animal rights protection is a fundamental one for the animal rights
activists especially in Western societies. There are animal rights organisations in
the USA, UK and some European countries, with the sole aim of protecting and
rescuing animals around the world. There are series of legislations also from the
governments of various countries with the aim of prohibiting wanton and
unreasonable killing of animals or violation of animal rights. But is it the same in
Africa? The answer is not straightforward. Why is this so? Do Africans really
believe in the validity of such rights? If they do, are they really thinking about it, just
like Westerners? These questions are addressed in this paper, which agrees with
the view of the supporters of animal rights. Essentially, it argues that given the
enormity of socio-economic and political challenges confronting African countries,
the issue of animal rights seems not to be a matter of priority in practice for many
African leaders. The focus of this paper is that the inherent challenge of securing
human rights in Africa, coupled with socio-economic and political problems
confronting African countries, is basically responsible for ineffective protection of
animal rights in Africa. Thus, this paper concludes that if human rights are taken
seriously in Africa, animal rights will be taken seriously. 
Keywords: Animal rights, human rights, African beliefs, African religions, culture
Introduction
The question of the relationship between human beings and non-human animals is an essential
one that cuts across every culture, religion and society. In recent time, this question has
generated controversies among the ethicists as well as social and political philosophers. The so-
called animal rights activists/defenders have engaged their opponents in argumentative
discussions at various levels.  Scholars such as Tom Regan and Peter Singer defended moral
equality of human beings and non-human animals with a resolution that non-human animals
have rights. Thus, using animals for education, product safety testing, and experimentation,
harmful non-therapeutic experimentation in particular, is not justifiable. Others, such as R.G.
Frey, Neil Smith and Edwin Locke, are of the opinion that non-human animals have no rights.
Considering how scholars are divided over the subject matter, Tom Regan, Peter Singer,
Richard Ryder and Peter Wilson argue in defence of animal rights. For them, non-human
animals are like us in many respects; they have similar physiological make-up, biological make-
up, and psychological make-up to human beings. Also, animals suffer in the same way that
humans do. Hence the conclusion that it is impossible to justify actions that inflict pain on
animals. Animals, like humans, are entitled to the basic right to live free of suffering. Meanwhile,
scholars such as Frey (1995), Smith (1996) and Locke (1997) are of the opinion that non-human
animals have no rights. They argue that animals are not rational, they cannot make moral
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choices, they lack the values of human beings; they are property needed to fulfil human needs.
Nevertheless, in this paper, I agree with the arguments of the defenders of animal rights. Why is
this so? The answer is simply because the main arguments of the opponents of animal rights are
not sufficient to establish the non-existence of such rights. It should be reported at this stage that
this paper is a preliminary evaluation of the ‘state of the art’ of African thought regarding animal
rights. The paper will be developed in another full-blown article in order to tdeal with the
arguments that this one could not exhaust. 
This paper is divided into three sections. The first discusses the issue of animal rights and
the beliefs of Africans about it, the second discusses Tom Regan’s reasoning on why animals
have rights. The third section considers some arguments to establish why animal rights
protection in Africa is facing challenges in present conditions. Let us begin the discussion with
the issue of animal rights in particular, and the question of rights in general.
Animal rights and the question of rights
Rights have become a dominant concept in the moral and political discourse of contemporary
democracies, displacing to some extent, at least where moral issues are concerned, talks on the
common good, general wellbeing and social justice (Campbell 2010:669). For the sake of clarity,
issues of this controversial nature require definitions of terms. In what way are we using the term
“right”? Following Mill’s explanation on rights: 
When we call anything a person’s right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to
protect him in the possession of it, either by the force of law, or by that of education and
opinion … To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to
defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask, why it ought? I can give
him no other reason than general utility (Mill 1962:309).    
From the above quotation, the fundamental point to be made here is that for every right there
must be a corresponding obligation or duty on the part of others to protect such rights. This view
is also supported by Campbell. In his view, 
More recently, it has become common to associate rights with responsibilities, although
it is often not clear whether this is meant to curtail the scope of rights by making people’s
rights conditional on the fulfilment of their duties, or to strengthen the impact of rights by
emphasising the duties of various parties to uphold the rights of others (Campbell
2010:669). 
The next question is: do animals have rights? The straightforward answer according to the
activists is yes. According to Peter Wilson,
Philosophers have been arguing for millennia over exactly where rights come from.
There have been nearly as many theories put forward as there have been philosophers.
They range from divine commandment to majority rule to pure self-interest. Some
philosophers even deny that there are such things as rights. In the interest of time, let’s
take the pragmatic approach and just assume rights exist and that humans possess
them. Animal rights must then stand or fall on the ability to show that it is inconsistent or
irrational to grant rights to humans but to deny them to animals (Wilson1999:17). 
Granted that animals have rights, what are these animal rights? From the Free Dictionary, animal
rights is defined as the right to humane treatment claimed on behalf of animals, especially the
rights not to be exploited for human purposes. The concept of animal rights is the ideal that the
most basic interest of animals should be afforded the same consideration as the similar interest
of humans. Now, one important question is this: who should protect animal rights? The answer to
this question is not far-fetched. From Campbell’s quotation above, the duty of securing animal
rights lies with human beings. In other words, for there to be animal rights and for animal rights to
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be protected, there must be a corresponding duty or responsibility on the part of human beings to
protect such rights.
Now, what are the objectives of animal rights defenders? For Regan, animal rights activists
are committed to a number of goals, including:  
•  the total abolition of the use of animals in science; 
•  the total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture; 
•  the total elimination of commercial and sport hunting and trapping (Regan 1985:13). 
The question of rights is a complex one among scholars because it could be used either in a
moral or in a legal sense. In other words, one might be talking about moral rights or legal rights.
One clear line of demarcation between the two is that, while legal rights are justiciable, moral
rights are not. But in championing animal rights, what kind of rights are we talking about? What is
the concern of philosophers as regards the status of animals? The simple answer is that
philosophers are interested in the two, depending on the direction of the discussion. Tom Regan
and Peter Singer, for instance, defend moral equality of human beings and non-human animals.
According to Regan, it is wrong when any animal’s rights are violated in pursuit of benefits for
others (Regan 2002:88). The import of Regan’s view is that non-human animals (lower animals)
have the same moral rights as human beings (higher animals or human animals). In other words,
non-human animals have the same moral status as human beings. Now, what are the African
views and beliefs regarding animal rights? Do Africans also believe that animals have the same
moral status as human beings? These questions are addressed in the next section.
The issue of animal rights and Africans’ beliefs
Do Africans believe in animal rights? The answer to this question is a complex one. There is no
consensus on African beliefs on animal rights, just as there are divisions in Western societies
over the reality of rights for non-human animals as well. It is a common belief for Africans,
especially the devotees of indigenous religions, that sacrifices and rituals must be performed as
a matter of duty; as part of religious rites and worship, in order to appeal to gods and ancestors.
In fact this is considered a pious act. Thus, to perform some of these sacrifices, animals must be
slaughtered in the ritual process. In other words, a traditionalist considers slaughtering of
animals for ritual purposes part of his/her religious obligations.  
However, is the idea of defending animal rights a totally foreign or alien concept to
Africans? My answer is no. This answer is borne out by the fact that defending human rights and
non-human animal rights cannot be removed from African socio-cultural experience, following
the communitarian nature of African societies. Now, when we move further to the question of
whether or not Africans believe that human and non-human animals are equal in some morally
relevant respects as championed by Regan and Singer, the answer is complex. It is believed that
Africans live in a cultural or religious universe, but the truth is that some of them really believe in
the existence of animal rights while some do not. Let us now consider Tom Regan’s defence of
animal rights.
Tom Regan on why animals have rights
Tom Regan, a foremost animal rights activist, has written extensively on this subject. In fact,
Regan and Singer were known for championing the moral equality of human beings and animals.
Some of Regan’s works include Regan (1983) The Case for Animal Rights, Regan (2001)
Defending Animal Rights. Regan (2002) “Empty cages: animal rights and vivisection.” Regan
(2004) Animal Rights, Human Wrongs: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy, and Regan, (2004)
Empty Cages: Facing the Challenge of Animal Rights. In some of these works, we were able to
establish Regan’s arguments in support of animal rights. The arguments are physiological, by
cognitive-ability, and psychological.
125
Inkanyiso, Jnl Hum & Soc Sci 2018, 10(1)
Physiological argument 
Regan observes that human and non-human animals are alike physiologically. Drawing from
Darwinian analysis, Regan argues that,   
In all essential respects, these animals are physiologically like us, and we like them.
Now, in our case, an intact, functioning central nervous system is associated with our
capacity for subjective experience. For example, injuries to our brain or spinal cord can
diminish our sense of sight or touch, or impair our ability to feel pain or remember. By
analogy, Darwin thinks it is reasonable to infer that the same is true of animals that are
most physiologically similar to us. Because our central nervous system provides the
physical basis for our subjective awareness of the world, and because the central
nervous system of other mammals resembles ours in all the relevant respects, it is
reasonable to believe that their central nervous systems provide the physical basis for
their subjective awareness (Regan 2002:84).
Following the above quotation, Regan’s position is clear. But whether the position is correct or
not is open to another philosophical debate. However, this author finds the basis of Regan’s
argument too weak, in the sense that both Africans and non-Africans will find it difficult to accept
that non-human animals have rights just because they resemble human beings. Thus, a stronger
argument will be needed.  
Cognitive-ability argument 
According to Regan, human and non-human animals have certain cognitive abilities in common.
He states that,
In addition, both humans and other mammals share a family of cognitive abilities (we
both are able to learn from experience, remember the past, and anticipate the future) as
well as a variety of emotions (Darwin (1976) lists fear, jealousy, and sadness). Not
surprisingly, again, these mental capacities affect their behaviour. For example, other
mammals will behave one way rather than another because they remember which ways
of acting had pleasant outcomes in the past, or because they are afraid or sad (Regan
2002:84).
Psychological argument
Regan opines that the psychological complexity of mammals is a clear indication that non-human
animals are like humans.  According to him, 
Moreover, that these animals are subjectively present in the world, Darwin understands,
is required by evolutionary theory. The mental complexity we find in humans did not
arise from nothing. It is the culmination of a long evolutionary process. We should not be
surprised, therefore, when Darwin summarises his general outlook in these terms: “The
differences between the mental faculties of humans and the higher animals, great as it
is, is one of degree and not of kind” (Darwin 1976: 80). The psychological complexity of
mammals (henceforth “animals,” unless otherwise indicated) plays an important role in
arguing for their rights. As in our case, so in theirs: they are the subjects-of-a-life, their
life, a life that is experientially better or worse for the one whose life it is. Each is a
unique somebody, not a replaceable something (Regan 2002:85).
The summary of Regan’s view is that human and non-human animals are alike and as a result,
equality and sameness of the two species ought to be emphasised. The nucleus of his argument
is that, without a doubt, if humans have rights, so too do these animals (Regan 2002:85). 
Metz presents a different account. According to him, 
The African theory entails that even if there is no intrinsic difference between two
beings, there could be a (modal) relational difference between them, because capacity
to have a life that is shared with, and cared for by, normal human beings, that grounds
126 
Inkanyiso, Jnl Hum & Soc Sci 2018, 10(1)
differential degrees of moral status. The idea that humans have a greater moral status
than animals is a persistent intuition, and invoking the property of degree of capacity for
communal relationship is a more attractive way to account for it than is the speciesist
one of the bare fact of human life (Metz 2011:6).
The import of this quotation is that Metz provides a clearer picture of how Africans’ view of the
relationship between human beings and non-human animals ought to be understood. Africans
believe that even though humans have a greater moral status than lower animals, this does not
rob lower animals of their rights. Even among human beings, a rational adult will be seen as
having a higher moral status than an infant or an imbecile. Yet, that will not rob an imbecile of his/
her rights. If a foetus should have rights as far as pro-lifers are concerned, why not non-human
animals? This question is the author’s argument in support of the view of the defenders of animal
rights. Let us now move to the challenges of protection of non-human animals rights in Africa.
The challenges of protecting non-human animal rights in Africa
In this section, I want to divide the challenges of protection of non-human animal rights in Africa
into two, namely the major versus minor challenges. The major challenges include the
challenges of human rights in Africa, lack of functional animal rights policies in Africa and
poverty.  The major challenges are discussed first.
The challenges of human rights in Africa 
Violation of human dignity largely affects non-human animals in Africa. Bringing so many war-
torn countries in Africa into the picture, it is obvious that there is gross violation of human rights in
those places. Now, championing the idea of animal rights in most of these places will as a matter
of fact be of secondary importance. The big problem is demanding animal rights from a person
who does not respect a co-human being. Apart from the manifest violation of human rights in
Africa, it is a fact that many African countries have lost and are still losing their citizens in
diaspora to unjust killings in different parts of the world, without taking any considerable
measures to demand justice. This remain a serious challenge to the protection of animal rights in
Africa. According to Mbia, 
Human rights abuse or violation in Nigeria has been a contentious and perennial
phenomenon … the ugly and image denting phenomenon has been the hallmark of
successive administration (both military and civilian) in the country. This has manifested
itself few years ago in the unlawful arrest, torture, genocide, etc. (Mbia 2007: 108).  
One important fact in Mbia’s argument is that this view can be extended to many other African
countries. They have similar features.
Lack of functional animal rights policies in Africa 
Closely related to the first is the second: that there is a lack of functional animal rights policies in
many African countries. Despite the fact that the first International Pan African Animal Welfare
Alliance (PAAWA) Conference on ‘Mainstreaming Animal Welfare in Africa’s Development’ held
in Nairobi, Kenya, from 2nd-4th September, 2013, there are still other policy issues.  Even in a
place like South Africa with all the structure on ground, we still need to revisit the issue of animal
rights in the country. 
Poverty 
Poverty is arguably the dominant problem in most of the African countries, to which all other
issues relate. According to Mandiyanike (2009:144), “Extreme and persistent poverty, hunger,
disease, and ignorance have come to characterise life in a typical developing country”. It is a fact
that many Africans are living below the poverty line. This was caused by many internal and
external factors. As a matter of fact, it is not out of place to trace poverty to unemployment in
African countries. According to Corrigan, unemployment is a significant problem and one of the
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key causes of poverty (Corrigan, 2009:10). As a result, a good number of Africans resorted to
hunting, fishing, and factory farming or using animals as farming tools as a means of livelihood.
Giving that one of the greatest instincts in life is the instinct for survival, African leaders will need
to create enough alternative jobs in order to dissuade those who engage in the kind of jobs that
affect the rights of non-human animals. 
Minor challenges
African culture and tradition
It is strange to tell a typical African man that his dog or cat should be accorded rights, respect
and dignity just like his children. The average African man was brought up with the mentality that
animals are created for human needs, use and enjoyment.
African Religion and Animal Rights
Case I: Ogun festival in Nigeria involves beheading dogs in public as part of the necessary rituals
for festivity by the devotees. 
Case II: Zulu festival in South Africa also involves beheading bulls or cows openly as part of the
ceremony.
Case III: Sallah festival also involves slaughtering rams and goats to commemorate the festival.
Animal rights in Africa: issues and challenges
In this paper, three arguments are developed as justifications to address the question of why
animal rights may not succeed in Africa: 
Religion and Cultural Arguments
The question of ritual slaughter of animals. Certain gods demand the fresh blood of animals, e.g.
Ogun (god of iron in Yoruba land).
Even the new-found religions, such as Islam and Christianity, permit ritual slaughter of animals 
for ceremonial purposes. 
Human rights argument
Violation of human rights in Africa poses a serious challenge to the protection of animal rights in
Africa. In Wiredu’s reflection, the problem that bedevilled modern Africa is … how to devise a
system of politics that, while being responsive to the developments of the modern world, will
reflect the best traditional thinking about human rights (Wiredu 1990:260). Thus, the implication
of Wiredu’s conception is that thinking about human rights is more pressing than some other
challenges. While Africans are still struggling with the question of human rights, the question of
animal rights may not be of the utmost importance. This, from this author’s point of view,
suggests a critical reflection on these two important questions.  
1. Do animals have rights?
2. Do non-human animals have equal moral status like human beings? 
While the first question could be answered in the affirmative by defenders of animal rights, both
in the west and Africa, the second is not so straightforward. In reviewed previous studies, no
African writer has defended this position like Peter Singer. 
According to Cornwell, 
The driving force behind Africa’s experiment with democracy came both from ideology
conviction and the growing impatience of an ever bolder public consciousness, and from
the related manner of the continent’s prevailing economic woes. On the other hand, the
politically conscious urbanised, professional and studies bodies began to rail against the
continued failure of their rulers to match rhetoric and promises to economic progress, for
much of Africa had experienced a steady decline in living standards in the 1970s and
1980s. On their part, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other
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bilateral aid donors also made it quite clear that if further financial assistance was to be
forthcoming, African leaders must protect the rights of the people. More specifically, they
had to become politically more accountable to their people, and curb corruption
(Cornwell 1995:15).
I think one way by which human rights can be protected the more in Africa is to agree with the
directives of the IMF and World Bank that African leaders ought to be more accountable to their
people. The import of this is that, if the rights of the people are well respected, it will reflect in the
way they react and respond to the rights of non-human animals. The truth is that many Africans
do not know that they have any rights due to the behaviours of some leaders. By extension, a
person whose rights are not protected will see no reason for discussions on animal rights.   In
another development, Galadima noted 
a process of organizing and managing legitimate power structures, entrusted by the
people, to provide law and order, protect fundamental human rights, ensure rule of law
and due process of law, provide for the basic needs and welfare of the people and the
pursuit of their happiness (Galadima 1998:117).
According to Regan (2002:88), it is wrong when any animal’s rights are violated in pursuit of
benefits for others. 
The need for an attitudinal shift to the question of animal rights in Africa
African traditional religions and culture, which formed the basis of the African belief system, can
be engaged to change the orientation of millions of African people who are still sceptical about
such rights because we are not ignorant of such scepticism. Attitudinal shift towards a more
enlightened and morally awakened society is needed where more people are working towards
rights for animals than ever before.
Do non-human animals and human beings belong to the same moral community? The
answer is yes. The point here is to raise arguments that will appeal to African tradition, culture
and religions.
Conclusion 
The issue of animal rights is a complex one that is wider than the scope of this paper. In fact it is
not as simple as many writers may argue. However, based on the scope of this paper, the
following conclusion could be reached. 
•  Every animal (both higher/lower) has a right to fair treatment
•  Non-human animals are animals
•  Therefore, every non-human animal has the right to fair treatment
It is our submission in this paper that the idea of defending animal rights is not a totally foreign or
alien concept to Africans. But, the challenge is that the question of rights is not really taken
seriously in many African countries; with manifest violation of such rights up till today despite the
democratic structure on ground. How can a country that could not protect the rights of her
citizens effectively protect the rights of non-human animals?  It is our view in this paper that
human rights protection is a key to the protection of animal rights. This is because if one respects
human rights and understands the pain that comes with the violation of such rights, it will be easy
to accord rights to non-human animals that share essential features with man.  From the paper,
some of the identified common problems in African countries are unemployment, access to land,
weak educational systems, gender discrimination, and poor health care systems. The argument
is that African leaders should focus more on building a society with enviable principles of
tolerance, magnanimity and fair-play, which are essential for socio-political order, so that both
human and non-human animals will have a sense of belonging in the same environment. In other
words, the protection of fundamental human rights is essential for the enhancement and
protection of fundamental animal rights.  
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